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CoRPORATI0Ns-D1ssoLuTION - lli:GHTS OF MEMBERS oF NoNPROFIT
CoRPORATION ON DISTRIBUTION OF AssETs-Defendant association was incorporated in 1921 on a nonstock basis for the purpose of maintaining a club for
social enjoyment. The association never maintained such a club, however, but
rather operated a plan whereby "funeral benefits" were paid to the heirs of
deceased members. At a special meeting on March 7, 1946, a plan was adopted
for final distribution of the assets of the association among its members "on a
basis for each month a member has been a member of the association." At a
subsequent meeting, the members unanimously adopted a resolution to divide
the association funds among its members or their heirs "in accordance with
action taken March 7, 1946." The trustees of the association subsequently
agreed that the first distribution of funds be made on a basis of 95 cents per
month for the period during which a member had been "continuously beneficial." This plan was to be submitted to the entire membership for approval,
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but prior to the date of this meeting, plaintiffs, members of the association, filed
a bill in equity praying that the defendant association be enjoined from distributing its assets except in accordance with state statute, which, plaintiffs contended, required equal distribution among members at the time of dissolution,
irrespective of the length of time of membership.. The association then filed a
petition for dissolution with a prayer that a distribution based on the plan proposed by the trustees be approved. This petition was consolidated with the
equity proceeding, and the chancellor dismissed the bill in equity and held that
the plan of distribution adopted at the meeting of March 7, 1946, and subsequently approved without opposition, was binding on all members. On appeal,
held, reversed. Unequal distribution of the assets of a nonstock, nonprofit corporation is not valid unless authorized by the articles or bylaws of the corporation being dissolved, and the trustees' distribution plan was never adopted as
a bylaw, since it differed from the distribution basis contained in the resolution
that the membership had adopted.1 De Champlain v. P. & R. Home Association, (Pa. Super. Ct. 1952) 90 A. (2d) 603.
The early common law rule adopted by the English courts to deal with the
problem of disposing of the assets of a dissolved corporation called for the reversion of all real property to the grantors or donors or their heirs, while all personal property escheated to the sovereign.2 Only a few American jurisdictions
have ever adopted any form of this reverter rule,3 and then only to the extent
that it applied to nonprofit corporations.4 Usually the additional modification
is imposed that for the rule to operate the property must have been donated to
and not purchased by the corporation.5 For the most part, disposition of corporate property by application of the early common law rules has been expressly
rejected as regards nonprofit, as well as profit-seeking, corporations.6 As a result,
in the absence of an applicable statutory scheme, the courts have had to formulate new rules and principles for the distribution of assets upon dissolution of
solvent, nonprofit corporations. Nonprofit corporations that have been organized
on a stock share basis are treated much the same as the ordinary commercial
1 The appellate court did not agree with the lower court's assumption that there was
no inconsistency between the two plans. The court at page 607 noted that the theory of
distribution behind the resolution was that distribution be made to each member in the
same proportion as his dues contributed to the accumulated funds. The trustees' plan, on
the other hand, gave no consideration to the months a membe,r belonged to the association
prior to the date of his last reinstatement to good standing.
2 Winsor and Webb's Case, Godb. 211, 78 Eng. Rep. 128 (1605); In re Higginson
and Dean, [1899] 1 Q.B. 325; also see Neptune Fire Engine Co. v. Board of Education
of Mason County, 166 Ky. 1 at 14, 78 S.W. 1138 (1915).
a Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct.
792 (1890); Mott v. Danville Seminary, 129 lli. 403, 21 N.E. 927 (1899).
4 14 ToLANB L. REv. 124 (1939).
5 Franklin County v. Blake, 283 lli. 292, 119 N.E. 288 (1918); 28 M:rCH. L. REv.
336 (1930).
6 McAlhaney v. Murray, 89 S.C. 440, 71 S.E. 1025 (1911); Smith v. Dicks, 197
N.C. 355, 148 S.E. 464 (1929); Hopkins v. Crossley, 138 Mich. 561, 101 N.W. 822
(1904).
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corporation, that is, distribution to the shareholders on a per share basis.7 But
the vast majority of nonprofit corporations seem to be nonstock corporations.
An analysis of these nonstock, nonprofit corporation cases requires that a distinction be drawn between the dissolution of the independent club or association and the dissolution of the organization that is merely a local unit of a larger,
parent organization.8 Normally, the latter situation involves regulations of the
parent organization which prescribe the disposition that is to be made of the
property of a subordinate unit in the event of a voluntary dissolution of the
unit, and these regulations of the parent are generally given legal effect by the
courts.9 In the case of the independent organization, however, there are rarely
any ready organizational rules which will determine the controversy that frequently rages between or among present members, former members and heirs
of deceased members.10 Consequently, in a number of cases the courts have
had to establish the respective rights of these various parties without the aid of
such rules or bylaws. There is some indication that a distinction is to be drawn
between nonprofit corporations that are instituted as "public" charities and those
that are instituted as "private" charities.11 Where a nonprofit corporation's funds
are acquired by virtue of outright gift for purely eleemosynary purposes and
without expectation on the part of members of obtaining any interest in the
organization's funds, at least some courts have classified the organization as a
"public" charity, and have thereupon decided that a member has no standing
for the purpose of claiming a share of the organizational fund by mere virtue
of his membership.12 It should be noted, however, that the cases in which this
type of organization has been found to exist have not been concerned with the
question of who does, in fact, have a valid claim to this property. 13 Most independent, nonstock, nonprofit corporations, however, fall outside of this "purely
public charity" classification, and with respect to these organizations the courts
719 C.J.S., Corporations §1767 (1940). Also see Schroeder v. Meridian Improvement Club, 36 Wash. (2d) 925 at 930, 221 P. (2d) 544 (1950) and the principal case
at 605 and 606. ·
s 168 A.L.R. 956 (1947). This distinction was made in the principal case.
9 Hermione Lodge No. 16, Knights of Pythias v. Grand Lodge, Knights of Pythias of
Alabama, 248 Ala. 473, 28 S. (2d) 166 (1946); In re Nokomis Tribe No. 307, Improved
Order of Red Men of Pennsylvania, 331 Pa. 53, 200 A. 23 (1938).
10 Organizational rules of distribution that are not contrary to an applicable statutory
plan are controlling. In re American Dramatic Fund Assn., 3 N.Y.S. 793, 22 Abb. N.C.
231 (1889). In the principal case, it was thought that an applicable statutory provision
required that an organizational rule dealing with the problem of distribution of assets have
the status of a corporate article or bylaw before a member could properly be denied his
right to an equal share of the assets.
11 "Indeed, the distinctive characteristics of a public charity are that its funds are
derived from gifts and devises and not from fees, dues and assessments, and that it is not
confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public." Neptune Fire
Engine Co. v. Mason County Board of Education, supra note 2, at 11. Also see the case
analysis in 168 A.L.R. 956 at 958 (1947).
12 Mason v. Atlanta Fire Co., 70 Ga. 604, 48 Am. Rep. 585 (1882); Humane Fire
Company's Appeal, 88 Pa. 389 (1879).
13 The court in the Mason case, supra note 12, intimates that the modified reverter
rule would apply to the determination of this question.
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have established the general rule that each member in good standing at the time
of dissolution has a right to share equally with the other members in the corporation's assets.14 The principal case is in accord with this general rule, for the
court, in effect, holds that each member of a nonstock, nonprofit corporation has
a right to an equal share of the corporate assets if there is no valid charter or
bylaw provision to the contrary.
John W. Hupp, S.Ed.

14 Schroeder v. Meridian Improvement Club, supra note 7. Also the cases cited in
note 6 supra. Baird v. Tyler, 185 Va. 601, 39 S.E. (2d) 642 (1946), departs from the
general rule only in so far as it allows the heir of a member deceased at the time of dissolution to participate.

